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THE QUEER TRUTH:




Wadell Sells worked for the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad
Company.' After sixteen years of uninterrupted employment, Sells obtained
a license from the city of Pittsburgh to become a stationary engineer.2 Sells
became overqualified for his position. Despite his qualifications, Sells
continued to work as an ash wheeler in the boiler room for presumably
lesser pay, and was consistently overlooked for a promotion when positions
opened.3 Sells claimed the Company's actions were part of a systematic
scheme to maintain a color line within the organization; the company
barred Sells from even bidding on an engineer's position solely because of
his race.4 Though Congress had at that time failed to comprehensively
protect against racial discrimination in the workplace, the district court
determined it was within its inherent power to protect both Sells and others
similarly situated from such "invidious discrimination." 5 As a result, the
court took an active step to prevent such manifest injustice at the height of
the Civil Rights Movement, employing the auspices of the Railway Labor
Act -instead of a then non-existent general prohibition on employer racial
discrimination. 6
* Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2011; B.A., Communications, Loyola University
Chicago, 2006. Special thanks the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their valuable guidance and
diligent editing. Further, this note is dedicated to my family for their continued love and support.
1. Sells v. Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, 190 F. Supp. 857,858-59 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
2. Id. at 859.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 859-60.
5. Id. at 860 (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
6. Sells was a part of a line of cases brought under the Railway Labor Act, which follows the
Supreme Court's precedent established in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944). In Steele, the court held a union could not discriminate in its representative capacity
arbitrarily-for example, based on race-as opposed to performance-related criteria. Id. at 202-03.
Steele, Sells, and other similar cases were a result of federal courts finding a creative avenue to
prevent discrimination in certain contexts prior to federal employment discrimination law or the
Fourteenth Amendment's applicability to such cases. See Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of
Pleadings: Rights, Rules, and Conley v. Gibson, 52 How. L.J. 73,87-88 (2008).
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It was against this backdrop that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
enacted. The Act's aim was to protect individuals from employment
discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.7 As a result, Sells and others similarly situated no longer needed to
rely on judicially creative maneuvers, such as the court's interpretation of
the limited Railway Labor Act, to bring a discrimination claim. After the
Civil Rights Act's passing, all employers regardless of industry8 were flatly
prohibited from discrimination, eliminating such odious discrimination
practices as those employed against Sells. The Civil Rights Act has since
progressed, now playing a preventative role against workplace
discrimination, notably with respect to sex-based discrimination. 9 It
represented a giant step forward at the height of the Civil Rights Movement
for individuals of all walks of life.
Though Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to equally
protect various forms of discrimination, including race and sex
discrimination, in reality, the social landscape for sexual equality was only
beginning to parallel the long struggle for racial equality. 0 Thus while
courts had a wealth of discussion surrounding equal racial rights, the
discussion was just beginning on how to treat the sexes equally." As a
result, the evolution of what constitutes sex discrimination has been an
uneven and expanding process playing out within the courts ever since
Title VII's enactment.12
The focus of this note is on the evolving protections offered in sex and
gender discrimination actions brought through Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act.'3 Specifically, this note argues gender stereotyping prohibitions protect
employees from discrimination based on sexual orientation, despite
Congress's current unwillingness to explicitly extend the Act in such
instances.'4 Due to the congressional silence, courts are attempting a
misguided effort to partition sexual orientation claims from sex and gender
orientation claims, leading to inconsistent results.'5 Section One of this note
7. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
8. Note that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only applies to employers who employ at
least fifteen employees; when originally enacted the Act only applied to employers with at least
twenty-five employees. Id. §2000e-2(a)(1) .
9. See Lehmann v. Toys R. Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 452 (N.J. 1993) (stating that sexual
harassment under Title VII should be applied with flexibility and not bound to historical
precedent).
10. LIsE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB: MATERNITY POLICY IN THE U.S. WORKPLACE 54-56
(Rutgers University Press 1993).
11. Id. at 56-59 (noting that unlike race discrimination, the definition of what constituted sex
discrimination substantively began its evolution after Title VII's passage).
12. See infra Section I.
13. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (2006).
14. For examples of courts inferring congressional intent to specifically exclude sexual
orientation, see, e.g., Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 2005); Bibby v.
Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2001); Simonton v. Runyon, 232
F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000).
15. See infra, Section II.
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describes the evolution of sex discrimination claims under Title VII,
including the expanding evolution of gender stereotyping over the past
half-century. Section Two identifies the current circuit split in defining
sexual discrimination, highlighting the high profile Prowel v. Wise Business
Forms16 case where the Third Circuit expressly recognized the blurred line
between discrimination based on gender stereotyping and sexual
orientation.'7 Section Three discusses the need for reform and clarity.
Section Four offers a simple yet effective solution to bring consistency
within the circuits and, accordingly, the law. Title VII's need to explicitly
encompass sexual orientation parallels the necessity of the Civil Rights Act
as originally enacted. This note concludes that Congress should step in to
avoid the potential situation whereby courts must either employ a creative
and generous judicial interpretation or deny otherwise-deserved justice to a
plaintiff who suffered "invidious discrimination."18
Before discussing the substantive law, it is necessary to define the key
terms used throughout this article to avoid conflation, which has arguably
been part of the problem for courts.'9 "Sex" is the physical or biological trait
associated with an individual; sex is most familiarly expressed in sexual
genitalia. 20 "Gender" refers to the cultural understandings, or stereotypes,
associated with masculinity and femininity, imposed on individuals by
society as a result of sex assignments. 21 Finally, "sexual orientation" reflects
an individual's personal desires or sexual interests, denoting whether a
person is attracted to a member of the same sex, different sex, or both
sexes.22 Thus, a person can have the sex (genitalia) of a male, while having a
feminine gender (as is culturally understood), and the sexual orientation
(subjective sexual attraction) to others of the same sex (homosexuality) or
opposite sex (heterosexuality).
II. EVOLUTION OF TITLE VII AND SEXUAL DISCRIMINATION
The origins of sex discrimination are almost as ambiguous as the
current protections it offers. Title VII's inclusion of sex discrimination was
the result of a late amendment added to the bill by Congressman Howard
W. Smith of Virginia. Smith's motives, however, were unclear. In fact, his
effort is widely believed to have been an attempt to kill the bill at the last
16. 579 F.3d 285 (3d Cir. 2009).
17. Id. at 291.
18. Sells, 190 F. Supp. at 860 (quoting Conley, 355 U.S.at 46).
19. For a comprehensive examination of the conflation of "sex," "gender," and "sexual
orientation" in the courts and an argument that this conflation is inherently opposed to the
elimination of gender and sex based stereotyping, see generally, Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies,
Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of "Sex," "Gender," and "Sexual Orientation in Euro-
American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1995).
20. Id. at 20-21.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Id. at 22-23.
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moment, thinking no one would vote for a bill requiring eradication of sex
discrimination.23 Fortunately, the bill passed with the amendment intact,
though the result left courts with little legislative history for guidance in
regards to sex discrimination. 24 There was little understanding -judicially
and socially-as to exactly what sex and gender equality meant in
practice.25 As a result, Title VII's protections for "sex" are constantly
evolving.
A quarter century ago, the Supreme Court squarely addressed Title
VII's protection of sex-based discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson.26 There the plaintiff, Mechelle Vinson, was given a job at a bank by
Sidney Taylor, a vice president of the bank. 27 After initially appearing as a
father-figure to Vinson, Taylor took Vinson out to dinner and requested
they go to a motel to have sexual relations.28 Vinson initially refused, but
later consented out of a fear of losing her job.29 Subsequently, Taylor
continued making unwelcomed sexual advances towards Vinson, going so
far as to fondle her in front of other employees, expose himself to her in the
restroom, and rape her on several occasions.30 Though both Vinson and
Taylor conceded that Vinson's promotions were solely merit based,31 the
Court held nonetheless that Taylor's actions constituted sex discrimination
under Title VII because it created for Vinson a repugnant and even fear-
inducing working environment-an environment that was the result of her
sex. 32 The holding carved two avenues for a Title VII sex discrimination
claim: first, Title VII protects against an employer predicating a promotion
or economic advancement based on an employee's sex, or willingness to
engage in sexual relations ("quid pro quo"); second, Title VII forbids sexual
advances that create a hostile working environment for the employee
("hostile environment"). 33
The Supreme Court's Title VII sex discrimination protection
jurisprudence expanded considerably three years later in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.34 There the Supreme Court considered the case of Ann Hopkins, a
senior manager who was effectively denied partnership at the accounting
23. Jo Freeman, How Sex Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9
LAW & INEQ. 163, 163 (1991). Freeman notes Smith's staunch opposition to civil rights legislation.
His suggestion of including "sex" in Title VII was followed by "several hours of humorous debate."
Id. (quoting 10 Cong. Rec. 2577 (1964)).
24. Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,64 (1986).
25. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
26. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
27. Id. at 59.




32. Id. at 73.
33. Id. at 65.
34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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firm Price Waterhouse.35 Despite high evaluations, partners at Price
Waterhouse denied her advancement, describing her as "macho,"
"overcompensating for being a woman," and in need of "a course at charm
school."36 Hopkins was advised she could improve her chances at becoming
a partner if she were to, "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."37
The Court held that under Title VII, gender must be irrelevant to
employment decisions,38 and that Price Waterhouse engaged in "sex
stereotyping" when it failed to promote Hopkins due to a belief that a
woman could not be aggressive or otherwise did not conform to social
stereotypes of her gender.39
The Court's distinction relied on the notion that since sex is linked to
gender, Congress intended Title VII to prohibit gender-based
discrimination as well as purely sex-based discrimination.40 The Court
reasoned that if Price Waterhouse was treating Hopkins adversely because
she was a woman (her sex) and her behavior was too masculine (her
gender), then sex stereotyping was implicated.41 Thus, the court established
that Title VII's reference to "sex" encompasses both the biological
differences between a man and a woman, as well as the perception of
whether a person complies with stereotypical gender norms.42 As a result,
this landmark decision opened the doors for plaintiffs to bring sex-
stereotyping (gender)43 discrimination claims against employers when the
employer bases a decision on an employee's failure to conform to the
employer's gender behavior expectations.
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court formally recognized that
gender discrimination under Title VII also applied to same-sex
discrimination.44 In Oncale, male plaintiff Joseph Oncale brought suit
alleging he was subjected to humiliating sex-related discrimination by his
35. Id. at 231-32.
36. Id. at 234-35.
37. Id. at 235.
38. Id. at 239-40.
39. Id. at 250-51. The plurality stated,
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that
they matched the stereotype associated with their group, for '[i]n forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.'
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (quoting L.A. Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
707 n.13 (1978)).
40. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239-40.
41. See id. at 250("In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis
of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of
gender").
42. Id. at 251.
43. See definition of gender, supra note 21, stating that gender reflects cultural stereotyping of
how sex roles act.
44. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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male supervisors and co-workers.45 Both the district and appellate courts
held that Oncale did not have a cause of action because same-sex
discrimination was not "because of sex" under Title VII and therefore was
not protected.46 The Supreme Court reversed the decision, with Justice
Scalia drawing an analogy to Title VII's protection of racial discrimination
from members of the same race.47 Though same-sex discrimination may not
have been the principal evil Congress intended to protect against with Title
VII, the Court held nonetheless that statutory provisions go beyond the
principal evils to cover "reasonably comparable evils," and sexual
harassment "must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the
statutory requirements." 48 Moreover, like opposite-sex discrimination, a
plaintiff in a same-sex discrimination suit does not need to prove the
harasser had any sexual desires towards the plaintiff; thus a plaintiff does
not need to demonstrate whether the harasser is homosexual or
heterosexual. 49
Oncale expressly acknowledged that Title VII's discrimination
protections advance beyond Congress's original scope, expanding
employee protections as our understanding of discrimination likewise
evolves.50 As a result of this developing precedent, current Title VII
jurisprudence supports a general prohibition on gender-motivated
discrimination in the workplace, regardless of the sex of the plaintiff or
harasser. Indeed, the Title's developments diverged from the bill's
Congressional origins are stark; Title VII's gender discrimination protection
is now a far cry from its questionable origins as merely a bill-killing
amendment.5' Today, an employee may bring a claim of gender
discrimination against an employer under a hostile environment theory52 or
a quid pro quo theory53 as long as the discrimination was because of the
plaintiff's sex or gender. The statute has been modified slightly, extending
the breadth of the doctrine to now apply to "mixed motives" cases,
declaring an employer in violation of Title VII if sex was a motivating factor
amongst other (non-protected) motivating factors.54 Accordingly, Title VII's
protections have expanded to even afford employees recourse when a
protected attribute is merely one of the bases of discrimination in
45. The discrimination included both verbal and physical abuse. Id. at 77.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 78.
48. Id. at 79.
49. Id. at 80-81.
50. Cf id. at 79 (Justice Scalia expressly acknowledged that Title VII could not be limited to its
original Congressional intent, but must expand to eradicate sexual discrimination as they manifest
in new forms).
51. Freeman, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
52. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (affirming hostile work environment
theory). See also Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65.
53. See Karibian v. Columbia University, 14 F.3d 773, 778 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing quid pro
quo theory). See also Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65.




III. PROWEL AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER GENDER DISCRIMINATION
Brian Prowel worked for Wise Business Forms ("Wise") operating a
machine called a nale encoder for thirteen years before learning he was
being laid off for lack of work.56 Prowel claimed the rationale supplied for
the firing was pretext; instead, Prowel asserted his termination was the
result of gender stereotyping.57 Prowel described himself in the pleadings
as an effeminate man who did not fit in with the "genuine stereotypical
males" at the plant.58 Prowel, a homosexual, was "outed" at work when an
anonymous individual left a newspaper clipping of a "male-seeking-male"
advertisement with a note reading, "Why don't you give him a call, big
boy."5 9 Following the outing, Prowel was subjected to constant harassment
from his coworkers.60 After becoming increasingly dissatisfied with his
work environment, in April of 2004 Prowel considered suing Wise for "not
'fitting in'" and began asking non-management personnel if they would
testify on his behalf.61 On May 6, 2004, Prowel met with members of
management to discuss his working conditions as well as whether he had
asked other employees to testify in a possible lawsuit, with Prowel denying
any such action.62 On December 13, 2004, Prowel was terminated effective
immediately for lack of work.63
After the district court dismissed the case in favor of Wise, the Third
Circuit reversed Prowel's gender discrimination claim, holding that Prowel
adduced evidence sufficient to demonstrate harassment based on gender
stereotypes.64 The court admitted the distinction between discrimination
because of sex and because of sexual orientation was a blurred line, and
since it was ambiguous it was therefore necessarily a jury question.65 The
55. See 110 Cong. Rec. 2728, 13837 (1964) (rejecting an amendment to add "solely" in front of
the words "because of" in Title VII).
56. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 286.
57. Id. at 291.
58. Id. at 287. Prowel is quoted in the opinion as describing the men at the plant as men "rough
around the edges," who hunted, fished, drank beer (as opposed to gin and tonics), and were fans of
sports. The court described Prowel as well-groomed, an upscale dresser, with a general effeminate
demeanor, having a rainbow on the trunk of his clean car, and that he pushed the buttons on the
nale encoder with "pizzazz." Id.
59. Id.
60. Certain coworkers would call him "Princess," "Rosebud," and "Faggot." Additionally,
tiaras and sexual lubricant were left at his work station, messages were written on the men's room
walls claiming Prowel had AIDS and engaged in sexual intercourse with other male employees, and
he was told he would "bum in hell" for his lifestyle. Prowel reported these incidents, but it was to
little avail. Id. at 287-88.
61. Id. at 287.
62. Id.
63. Id.




court decided that the evidence suggested that Wise discriminated against
Prowel because of both his sexual orientation and his gender
nonconformity-not conforming with "Wise's vision of how a man should
look, speak, and act[.]" 66 Thus, Prowel was not precluded from bringing a
cognizable Title VII claim merely because he is a homosexual.67
The Third Circuit's recent opinion is indicative of the courts' slow
movement to recognize claims that could be categorized as either sexual
orientation discrimination, gender-conformity discrimination, or both, as
gender stereotyping claims.68 Though courts have made clear that a claim
based solely on sexual orientation discrimination is barred, there is certainly
ambiguity in distinguishing the difference between discrimination based on
sex, on gender, and on sexual orientation.
Given Prowel's novelty, there are few citing sources. One case, however,
immediately sought to distinguish Prowel despite similar facts. Ayala-
Sepulveda v. San German69 distinguished Prowel by stating there the
defendant's only well-pled claim of sexual stereotyping was simply the fact
that he was a homosexual.70 Many of the facts suggested the hostile
environment created in Alaya-Sepulveda were a result of a failed
relationship;71 however, the facts also seemed to suggest gender
discrimination more akin to Prowel than the district court acknowledged. 72
Regardless, the court held that this was merely a complaint of sexual
orientation discrimination and therefore dismissed the action on summary
judgment.73
Prowel is not the first Court of Appeals case to highlight that a blurred
line between sexual orientation and gender discrimination prevents
dismissal at the pleadings stage. Five years before Prowel, the Sixth Circuit
held in Smith v. City of Salem74 that gender stereotyping applied to a
66. Id. at 292.
67. Id.
68. See, e.g., Heller v. Colombia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1223 (D. Or.
2002) (stating that one way to determine if discrimination was based on sex was to look at whether
the harasser would have acted the same way if victim's gender had been different. "A jury could
find that Cagle would not have acted as she (allegedly) did if Plaintiff were a man dating a woman,
instead of a woman dating a woman. If that is so, then Plaintiff was discriminated against because
of her gender."); Centola v. Potter, 183 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408-10 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding that plaintiff
"does not need to allege that he suffered discrimination on the basis of his sex alone or that sexual
orientation played no part in his treatment.").
69. 661 F.Supp. 2d 130 (D.P.R. Sept. 30, 2009).
70. Id. at 137.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 133-35. Ayala-Sepulveda, a municipal worker, had been ridiculed and mocked for
being attracted to men, told he could never be promoted because of his sexual orientation, and in
response to threats from a coworker, told by the mayor that he should transfer. When he refused to
transfer, the mayor visited Ayala-Sepulveda's family and denounced Ayala-Sepulveda's
homosexuality. All of this points towards Ayala-Sepulveda not fitting within what his coworkers,
as well as the mayor, considered being an appropriate lifestyle for a male (heterosexuality) - which
would be gender stereotyping, just as Prowel was seen as not fitting in with the typical male at
Wise. See supra notes 49-51.
73. Ayala-Sepulveda, 661 F.Supp 2d. at 138.
74. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004).
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transgender employee. Though the court did not comment on the sexual
orientation of the plaintiff, it did find the defendant's adverse employment
decisions were based on gender nonconformity.75 Relying on Price
Waterhouse, the court noted that gender discrimination is part of the
evolution of Title VII's sex discrimination prohibition.76 After summarizing
Price Waterhouse's fact pattern, the court stated: "It follows that employers
who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or
otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because
the discrimination would not occur but for the victim's sex."77 An employer
cannot then discriminate against an employee for behavior it perceives
inappropriate for the employee's sex.78 Therefore, even if an employer
believes (correctly or not) that an employee is homosexual, he cannot
discriminate against that employee because he believes an individual
should engage in sexual activity only with members of the opposite sex. 79
Whether a plaintiff is actually homosexual or not is irrelevant to Title
VII's protections via gender stereotyping. In the Seventh Circuit case Doe v.
City of Belleville, twin teen boys brought an action for same-sex gender
discrimination for hostile environment discrimination in their city job.80
One of the twins, "H", who wore an earring, was nicknamed "fag" or the
"queer" by his coworkers, and his coworkers repeatedly told H to go to San
Francisco "with the rest of the queers." 81 One of H's co-workers, Jeff Dawe,
threatened H repeatedly, saying he'd take H to the woods and "get [him]
up the ass."8 2 H's co-workers would inquire in graphic terms if H was
having anal sex, and Dawe went so far as to trap H against a wall and grab
his testicles in front of other co-workers, while announcing to the group,
"Well, I guess he's a guy."83
The court went to great length describing the behavior in the case as
gender discrimination, stating that the discrimination existed independent
of whether H was actually homosexual or not.84 Despite the opinion's
75. Id. at 573-74.
76. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251).
77. Id. at 574.
78. Id. The court in Salem comes to this conclusion as a result of discrimination for plaintiff's
transgender identity. However, the same proposition supports discrimination for sexual
orientation: both involve an employer's perception of gender behavior.
79. Cf. id. at 573-75 (The court addresses the issue in terms of transgender discrimination, but
the exact same issues are implicated by sexual orientation discrimination, rendering the court's
conclusions sound within this context.).
80. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998) (case vacated in light
of Oncale, 523 U.S. 75). The case was settled before rehearing.
81. Id. at 566-67.
82. Id. at 567.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 592. This case, as apparent by its subsequent history, came before the decision in
Oncale which expressly approved a same-sex discrimination suit. At the time, there was a split




length, the court made it a point to emphasize the simplicity of the case.85
Using Price Waterhouse as guidance, the court held that the homophobic
epitaphs and assaults towards H established that he did not conform to his
coworkers' view of appropriate masculine behavior, which is gender
harassment, irrespective of the parties' actual sexual orientations. 86 The
court did note that discrimination based on sexual orientation as opposed to
sex is beyond Title VII.87 While the court refused to create a rule saying anti-
gay discrimination is per se gender discrimination, it was careful to point
out that it is not so easy to categorize gender discrimination as distinct from
sexual orientation discrimination, especially at the pleadings stage.88
Belleville represented great strides by the Seventh Circuit in Title VII
understanding, especially in taking the time to painstakingly illustrate why
sexual orientation is virtually irrelevant for the purposes of gender
discrimination.89 Together, Belleville, Salem and Prowel signal careful
judiciary admissions that while the legislature has expressly declined to
include sexual orientation discrimination within Title VII, in application
Title VII's evolved to cover sexual orientation discrimination as "gender
discrimination" after Price Waterhouse.90
IV. TITLE VII's NEED FOR CLARITY
The irony of the decisions outlined in Part III, that recognize
homosexual discrimination claims under the auspices of gender
discrimination (perhaps more properly, gender nonconformity) is that Title
VII now recognizes -in effect - sexual orientation discrimination.91 Courts
85. See id. at 575.
86. Id. at 580. Again this pre-Oncale decision from 1997 is interesting to contrast with Ayala-
Sepulveda, 661 F. Supp 2d at 137 where the court felt that despite express remarks against Ayala-
Sepulveda's homosexuality by coworkers, managers, and the mayor to his family, the case was
distinguishable as not pleading gender stereotyping.
87. Belleville, 119 F.3d at 592.
88. Id. at 593, n.27.
89. See id. at 575 (stating that the divergent answers regarding whether same-sex harassment
constitutes sex discrimination requires addressing their reasoning within the context of other
decisions).
90. See id. at 593-94. (noting that though Title VII does not expressly protect against sexual
orientation discrimination, the court declared that "juxtaposed alongside of the homophobic
epithets that Belleville singles out are other remarks that implicate sex rather than sexual
orientation- the references to H as a 'bitch' . . . and inquiries professing confusion as to whether H.
was a 'girl or a guy,'" and thus constituted gender discrimination) Salem, 378 F.3d at 574 ("it follows
that employers who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses and makeup, or
otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in sex discrimination, because the discrimination would
not occur but for the victim's sex."); Prowel, 579 F.3d at 292, (acknowledging that not every sexual
orientation discrimination case can be a triable case under Title VII because it would contradict
Congress' intentional omission of sexual orientation under Title VII. However, the court declared
that in this case, merely because the evidence suggests the discrimination was motivated by
Prowel's sexual orientation, it does not vitiate the claim that he failed to conform to gender
stereotypes.).
91. It is necessary to highlight that since sexual orientation is not within Title VII's text, the
courts must rely on gender stereotyping under Price Waterhouse. This, along with Congress' express
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have for years attempted to artificially divorce sex, gender and sexual
orientation. What followed was a confusing mess with some plaintiffs
obtaining relief and others being thrown out of court at the pleadings stage
for bringing a sexual orientation claim -in other words, a claim the court
could not conceptually separate as a gender discrimination claim. While
much of this came down to proper (and crafty) pleading,92 courts are
suspicious of plaintiffs attempting to camouflage a sexual orientation claim
as a gender or sex discrimination claim, since members of Congress insist
Title VII's protections do not cover sexual orientation discrimination. 93 Still,
the irony exists: gender discrimination claims include claims based on an
employee's gender not matching the stereotypes of his or her sex, as
perceived by their coworkers.94 Homosexuality necessarily involves a
person of one sex being attracted to someone of the same sex.95 Thus when
employees are harassed for not conforming to their sex roles by being
homosexual, they are being discriminated against based on their sexual
orientation and gender.96 Sexual orientation discrimination and gender
discrimination are synonymous; so by allowing gender discrimination
claims, courts have passively acquiesced to sexual orientation claims under
Title VII. But as illustrated above in the split authority, 97 this acquiescence is
far from universal due to Title VII's current state requiring segregation of
sexual orientation from sex and gender.
Consequently, the key flaw with Title VII, as currently enacted, is its
attempt to separate discrimination based on sex or gender from
discrimination based on sexual orientation. 98 Discrimination based on
sexual orientation is intrinsically intertwined with gender and sex, and
separating the topics is impossible.99 When the courts do attempt to
artificially separate the two, it almost always occurs in conjunction with a
refusal to incorporate sexual orientation, leads to inconsistent results. See supra Part Ill. However, as
this Part argues, since sexual orientation stereotyping is indistinguishable from gender
stereotyping, Title VII must be amended to provide judicial clarity.
92. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 424 F. Supp. 2d 203, 208-09 (D. D.C. 2006); Simonton, 232 F.3d
at 38.
93. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
94. "Coworkers" is used broadly to include any agent of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(2006).
95. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (2010), available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/homosexual. See also supra Part fl.
96. See Simonton, 232 F.3d at 37-38. There, the court recognized this very logic without issuing
an opinion on its merits, since plaintiff only presented the theory of sexual discrimination to the
district court.
97. See supra Part III.
98. See Centola, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 406.
99. The difficulty in defining "sexual orientation" as its own category was famously
highlighted in 1948, when Alfred Kinsey proposed that heterosexuality and homosexually were
part of a sliding scale (The "Kinsey Scale") akin to a continuum as opposed to rigid categories.
Kinsey wrote, "Males do not represent two discrete populations, heterosexual and homosexual. The
world is not to be divided into sheep and goats . . . The living world is a continuum in each and
every one of its aspects." Alfred Kinsey, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 639 (W.B. Saunders




homosexual plaintiff bringing a discrimination claim, but rarely with a
heterosexual plaintiff. In fact, homosexual plaintiffs are often encouraged to
hide their sexual orientation.100 This is due to what Zachary Kramer has
termed the "invisibility of heterosexuality." 01 Courts perceive a
homosexual plaintiff as attempting to distort Title VII by bringing an
otherwise Congressionally-characterized "barred claim" for sexual
orientation by phrasing it as gender discrimination. Moreover, if a
homosexual plaintiff does bring an otherwise valid sex or gender
discrimination claim, a defendant is encouraged to defeat the claim by
categorizing it as a sexual orientation claim.102
Courts have acknowledged the interrelation between sex, gender and
sexual orientation, and the near impossibility of their divisibility.103 In
Heller,104 the plaintiff Liz Heller was allegedly subjected to a litany of
homophobic comments from her employer. 05 As a result, she brought a sex
discrimination claim under Title VII, asserting that the prohibition on
gender stereotyping includes degrading homophobic comments as well as
heterosexual comments.106 The court agreed, noting that the benefits of Title
VII should not be limited to heterosexual plaintiffs. 07 The court stated:
If an employer subjected a heterosexual employee to the sort of
abuse allegedly endured by Heller -including numerous unwanted
offensive comments regarding her sex life-the evidence would be
sufficient to state a claim for violation of Title VII. The result should
not differ simply because the victim of the harassment is
homosexual. 08
This is only a logical product of the interconnection between sex, gender
and sexual orientation. Heller endured discrimination because her
100. Justin M. Swartz et. al., Nine Tips for Representing LGBT Employees in Discrimination Cases, 759
PRACrISING L. INST.: LMG. 95, 103 (2007). The authors suggest pleading of homosexual orientation
may prove fatal to a case, as federal courts are more involved in lip service when they claim sexual
orientation is irrelevant to a Title VII claim.
101. Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 205, 231-32 (2009)
(discussing the "privilege" of heterosexuality).
102. See Valdes, supra note 19, at 123-25 (identifying a "sexual orientation loophole" where
heterosexual plaintiffs can generally bring a claim for sex or gender orientation, but when a
homosexual plaintiff brings the claim the defendant shifts the focus to the plaintiffs sexual
orientation and claims the plaintiff is attempting to bring an unprotected claim under Title VII).
103. E.g. Schroer, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 209 (noting that both lines of cases illustrate "claims of
adverse action that partake in some measure of sex stereotyping, and yet the courts deciding
them-rejecting claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation or violations of grooming and
dress codes-have not clearly articulated what, if anything, distinguishes any of the cases from
Price Waterhouse."); Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 878, 890 (E.D. Wis.
2002) ("The line between discrimination on the basis of sex and discrimination on the basis of actual
or perceived sexual orientation is not always a clear one."); Centola, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 408
(describing line as "hardly clear.").
104. 195 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
105. See id. at 1217-18.
106. See id. at 1217.
107. See id. at 1222.
108. Id. at 1222-23.
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employer perceived that Heller was not attracted to the sex to which
women are typically attracted. 109 Thus the employer's discrimination is
rooted in its gender expectations, and Heller's perceived sexual orientation
not conforming to those expectations.
Separating sexual orientation from gender and sex, however, begs the
question at issue in discrimination contexts. A homosexual person is more
likely than a heterosexual person to be perceived as not fitting in with
gender stereotypes.110 By the court attempting to separate and eventually
confusing the concepts of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, however, it
becomes more difficult for a homosexual plaintiff to bring an action based
on gender discrimination."' What results is double punishment for a
homosexual person: a homosexual person is more likely to be subject to
gender discrimination for not fitting in, and is at the same time less likely to
have a day in court.
The Ayala-Sepulveda decision highlights the double punishment
homosexual plaintiffs endure under current Title VII construction. Courts
are expected to delineate between two indivisible prongs: gender and
sexual orientation discrimination. The court concluded, based on the
pleadings, that Ayala-Sepulveda's allegations of gender discrimination
were barred because in reality he was only pleading sexual orientation
discrimination.112 However, the facts suggest that his sexual orientation
discrimination was a result of his not fitting in with gender stereotypes:113
Ayala-Sepulveda's discrimination began after a relationship with another
male employee, Jose J. Rodriguez-Vega, ended.114 Following their
separation, Rodriguez-Vega denied being homosexual himself, portrayed
himself as heterosexual, and verbally and physically assaulted Ayala-
Sepulveda for being homosexual.115 Rodriguez-Vega also allegedly
recruited other employees as a part of a conspiracy to have Ayala-
Sepulveda fired.116 When Ayala-Sepulveda approached his superiors about
these issues, pointing out that they were both homosexual together despite
109. See id. at 1224.
110. Cf Kramer, supra note 101, at 232 (stating that a homosexual man is more likely to deviate
from the socially-determined stereotypical masculine man since a man is stereotypically expected to
be attracted to women).
111. This is due to the perceived bootstrapping effect. See Valdes, supra note 19, at 123-24;
Kramer, supra note 101, at 231-32.
112. See Ayala-Sepulveda, 661 F.Supp.2d at 137 (agreeing with Prowel and arguing that while the
line between "because of sex" and "because of sexual orientation" can be difficult to draw,
"plaintiffs allegations in this case do fall clearly on one side of the line.").
113. Ayala-Sepulveda, like many other cases involving double punishment of a homosexual
plaintiff, was decided at the pleadings stage. It is well established that at the pleadings stage, the
court must view all the evidence and factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). This is noteworthy because the
court is thus required to give deference to Ayala-Sepulveda's allegations, even if contested.
Therefore, the court-and the reader, for the purposes of this exercise-should treat the allegations
as true. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-323.





Rodriguez-Vega's ostracizing, the mayor allegedly came and echoed
homophobic remarks to Ayala-Sepulveda and his family.117
Despite demonstrating that Rodriguez-Vega was the problematic
employee, Ayala-Sepulveda's superiors demanded that Ayala-Sepulveda
transfer, and did not punish Rodriguez-Vega. 118 Using the test many courts
employ in Title VII cases (asking whether the defendant would have acted
differently if the plaintiffs sex had been different) it is manifest that Ayala-
Sepulveda would have never have been treated to such torment if he were a
woman engaged in the exact same behavior.
The same fact pattern restated illustrates the double standard. Imagine
an employee who was physically and verbally assaulted by an ex-boyfriend
coworker, and was further harassed and ostracized by other coworkers for
the past relationship. The employee then complains to a supervisor, who
instead of punishing the ex-boyfriend, instead requires the employee
transfer to a job the employee does not want. The employee's boss then tells
the employee that he does not approve of the employee's sexual life, and
therefore he will not assist the employee.119 This recasting illustrates the
double punishment for Ayala-Sepulveda: he was harassed for his
orientation- including verbal and physical assaults-yet the court
dismissed his case on the pleadings.120
It seems that a reasonable person could have decided Ayala-Sepulveda
was subjected to discrimination on account of a gender stereotype.121
However, since the court saw this as Ayala-Sepulveda bootstrapping his
way to relief, his claim was dismissed before it ever left the ground.122 The
standard for summary judgment dismissal is whether, accepting all of the
complaint's allegations as true, the plaintiff has set out plausible grounds
for relief.123 While it is clear that a complaint containing only legal
conclusions does not survive,124 the standard is intended to be flexible,
dismissing claims only if no reasonable juror could return a verdict for the
non-moving party.125 If it is not even clear to courts when a person is
117. Id. at 135.
118. Id.
119. Cf. id. at 134-135 (the facts are restated without using the gender or sexual orientation of the
plaintiff).
120. Id. at 138.
121. Cf. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 291 ("As this appeal demonstrates, the line between sexual
orientation discrimination and discrimination 'because of sex' can be difficult to draw." The court
then said viewing the facts in favor of Prowel, as it is required to do on review, since it could be
argued as both sexual orientation and gender discrimination, the question is necessarily a jury
question.).
122. This case is a prime example of Kramer's point that courts see a homosexual plaintiff as
bootstrapping their way into a Title VII claim, whereas a similarly situated heterosexual's sexual
orientation is not even consciously considered. Kramer, supra note 101, at 219-20.
123. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
124. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
125. Mowlana v. Mukasey, No. 08-cv-01769-LTB, 2009 WL 130571, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 20, 2009)
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323).
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pleading a sexual orientation claim as opposed to a gender discrimination
claim, 126 how could it be so clear that no reasonable juror would find
otherwise? 127 The Ayala-Sepulveda court held that, as a matter of law, the
discrimination against Ayala-Sepulveda was permissible under Title VII
because it was only sexual orientation and not gender discrimination.12s In
reality, sexual orientation is a combination of sex and gender in
determining subjective sexual attraction.129 Since sex and gender are
inseparably related to sexual orientation, it is impossible to distinguish the
claims and say, with certainty, a plaintiffs claim is gender discrimination or
sexual orientation discrimination.130 Any attempt to separate the concepts
as discrete, independent entities leads naturally to conflation and
inconsistent - and somewhat illogical - results.
Consequently, as it is currently articulated and emphasized by
Congress-as well as interpreted by some circuits-Title VII allows
employers to freely discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation,131 by
converting legitimate gender discrimination claims by into sexual
orientation claims,132 and disproportionately prevents homosexuals from
relief via the judiciary. 33 In fact, employers are currently using what
126. See supra Part Ill.
127. If a material fact is in dispute, the case should not be dismissed as a matter of law. Mowlana,
2009 WL WL 130571, at *2. Needless to say, whether a plaintiff is claiming gender discrimination or
trying to deceive the court by disguising a "purely" sexual orientation discrimination (despite
explicitly claiming gender orientation) is a material fact. Also, it is important to remember that
jurors "are not experts in legal principles." Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 302 (1981). Cf. Belleville,
119 F.3d at 589 (looking at the context of same-sex discrimination generallyand noting that by
worrying about whether sexual orientation can be grounds for an otherwise cognizable claim of
discrimination, the results would be for a terrible and invasive discovery process, as well as judicial
process as a whole).
128. See Ayala-Sepulveda, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 138. Again worth noting is that if gender
discrimination was even one motive, then Title VII's mixed motives jurisprudence requires the
motion be denied -even if it includes sexual orientation or any other motive not covered by Title
VII. See supra note 54.
129. ANNE-MARIE MOONEY COTTER, ASK No QUESTIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ANALYSIS
ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION 7-8 (2010).
130. See, e.g., id.; EDWARD STEIN, THE MISMEASURE OF DESIRE: THE SCIENCE, THEORY, AND ETHICS
OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 36-38 (2001); MARK BLASIUS, SEXUAL IDENTITIES, QUEER POLITICS 185 (2001).
131. See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 217-18 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that it was
difficult to discern whether lesbian plaintiff was claiming discrimination based upon her gender,
appearance, or sexual orientation and, as a result, holding that the plaintiff was, in essence, trying to
"bootstrap" her sexual orientation discrimination claim into court, and dismissing the claim as not
being cognizable under Title VII); Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 243 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001)
("The degrading and humiliating treatment Rene contends that he received from his fellow workers
is appalling, and is conduct that is most disturbing to this court. However, this type of
discrimination, based on sexual orientation, does not fall within the prohibitions of Title VII.");
Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999) ("[Sexual orientation
discrimination] is a noxious practice, deserving of censure and opprobrium. But we are called upon
here to construe a statute as glossed by the Supreme Court, not to make a moral judgment-and we
regard it as settled law that . . . Title VII does not proscribe harassment simply because of sexual
orientation").
132. See Kramer, supra note 101, at 242-43. In fact, employers can use this approach for
heterosexual cases as well, arguing that a heterosexual's gender stereotype claim is merely a sexual
orientation claim in disguise.
133. Cf Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining the
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Kramer coined the "bootstrapping loophole" to take otherwise legitimate
claims of gender discrimination and have the case dismissed as an
impermissible sexual orientation claim.134 This result is far from the anti-
discriminatory goals behind Title VII's enactment and evolution.135
V. MOVING FORWARD: AMENDING TITLE VII
The proposed solution for revising Title VII is strikingly simple:
Amend Title VII to include gender and sexual orientation.136 The amended
Title VII should prohibit discrimination on the grounds of race, color,
religion, sex, gender, sexual orientation or national origin.137 The first half of
the proposal would merely reflect the law as it is interpreted today by the
courts -on one hand explicitly (gender) 138 and on the other hand implicitly
(sexual orientation)139. The result would reinforce the existing protections
on gender and remove the confusion regarding sexual orientation. No
longer will courts be forced to artificially sever a "legitimate" gender-based
claim from an "illegitimate" sexual orientation claim. This would also
remove the significant barrier of the double punishment homosexuals face
by the current construction of Title VII.140 Finally, the statutory language
would reflect the realities of sexuality: that gender and sexual orientation
are inseparably linked, and not subject to categorical classifications-
something Kinsey famously stated almost 70 years ago.141
Admittedly, this attempt is not necessarily novel. Congressional efforts
Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 Am. U. L. REV. 677, 722 (1998) (discussing how critiques of Title
VII are based on the presumption that, in theory, heterosexual expressions are not tolerated to the
same degree that homosexual expressions are not tolerated in the workplace and, as a result, this
presumption would then make Title VII fair, but in reality homosexuals are without redress in the
courts while heterosexuals enjoy the invisibility of being the majority).
134. See Kramer, supra note 101, at 243. Again, the mixed motives jurisprudence suggests
notwithstanding a belief that Title VII requires separating otherwise inseparable concepts, even if
gender is a motivating factor, then the motion to dismiss claims should be denied. However, with
the dismissals highlighted throughout this note, the double prejudice against homosexual plaintiffs
clearly survives.
135. See generally Harvard Law Review Association, Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive
Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984). When it enacted Title VII,
Congress intended to protect discrimination resulting from an imbalance of power -where a
powerful group uses its power to discriminate against a vulnerable group.
136. Though gender is already included in Title VII, it is not delineated in the Act's text but
instead incorporated under Price Waterhouse jurisprudence. See supra Part II. By adding it into the
statute's text, it codifies the established precedent while protecting gender discrimination's
potential jurisprudence devolution.
137. Emphasis added where the proposal differs from the current Act.
138. See discussion of Vinson, Price Waterhouse, and Oncale, and the progression of Title VII's
current recognized protections of gender discrimination, supra Part II.
139. Admittedly the majority of courts do not allow sexual orientation claims even when framed
solely as gender discrimination. Still, as I argue, the claims are the same as gender orientation
claims. See supra Parts III, IV. To avoid confusion, however, within the courts, I assert it is essential
the legislature add both gender and sexual orientation, so the courts no longer have to guess at the
scope of Title VII's purview.
140. See generally supra notes 110-12 and accompanying discussion of double punishment.
141. See Kinsey, supra note 99 at 639.
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to include sexual orientation under Title VII date back to 1975.142 Though
these efforts have come close since the first failed attempts, there has yet to
be a breakthrough in legislatively expanding Title VII.143 Lately, Congress
began taking a more creative route to accomplish the same aims:
introducing legislation separate from actually amending Title VII. The
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (EDNA) proposes to eliminate sexual
orientation discrimination in the workplace.144 While these efforts appear to
have momentum,145 they are an inadequate remedy for Title VII's ills.
First, there is a very real chance that a separate bill would not enjoy
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment while an amendment to Title
VII would.146 The Supreme Court has found anti-discrimination laws of the
Civil Rights Act applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, including Title VII's prohibition on sex discrimination.147
However, courts have held disability legislation, similar to ENDA where it
prohibited discrimination apart from Title VII, to be inapplicable to states
via the Fourteenth Amendment.148 By enacting ENDA as a stand-alone
statute, Congress heightens the risk that the judiciary will interpret sexual
orientation discrimination as not addressing a suspect clasS149 and not
elevating it to Fourteenth Amendment applicability.150 Though express
inclusion of gender and sexual orientation classifications in Title VII cannot
guarantee Fourteenth Amendment protection, Congress' incorporation of
those classes with the rest of Title VII-already enjoying Fourteenth
Amendment protection -sends a message to the judiciary that gender and
sexual orientation should be treated the same.151 Moreover, by excluding
sexual orientation from Title VII and instead introducing a separate bill,
Congress is itself engaging in a symbolic contradiction: Title VII was
generally enacted to protect discrimination against especially vulnerable
groups of people and to promote equality in the workplace.15 2 Not
142. See H.R. 13019, 94th Cong. (2d. Sess. 1976); H.R. 10389, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975); H.R.
2667, 94th Cong. (1st Sess. 1975). Three separate bills were introduced in a short timeframe to
expand Title VII to include sexual orientation. All three bills failed to leave the Judiciary
Committee.
143. See S. 2056, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996). In fact, Sen. Ted Kennedy's bill was defeated in the
Senate by only one vote, 49-50.
144. See H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) and S. 1584, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), for the
most recent proposed versions of the bill. A version of the bill has been proposed every session
since 1994.
145. The House version has 194 co-sponsors, while the Senate version has 43 co-sponsors.
146. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Instead of EDNA, A Course Correction for Title VII, 103 Nw. U. L.
REV. COLLOQUY 209, 214 (2008).
147. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729-30 (2003) (including sex
discrimination's related cause of gender discrimination).
148. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365-67 (2001) (holding that disabled
individuals are not part of a traditionally suspect class to warrant Fourteenth Amendment
protection).
149. See id. at 366.
150. See Hendricks, supra note 146, at 214-215.
151. Id. at 212.
152. Though the primary vehicle was race discrimination, Title VII's sweeping breadth to protect
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including gender or sexual orientation discrimination in Title VII suggests
that while employees should benefit from a discriminatory-free workplace,
gender and sexual orientation discrimination is distinct from other
protected characteristics in Title VII.
153
It may appear on the surface that this is not the time for Congress to
succeed where it has previously failed. There is no ignoring the polarization
issues of homosexuality in the modem political landscape. One needs to
only look at legislative action on homosexual marriage to see the ardent
debate engaged across the country.154 This article is too narrow to address
all issues raised by homosexuality, but it does warrant mention within the
political context of any proposed amendment to Title VII. Amending Title
VII is not analogous to gay marriage or other positive rights, because the
proposed amendment is primarily a negative right: it restricts
discrimination. Amending Title VII does not reflect an endorsement of
homosexuality, but instead a prohibition against discrimination.155 As it
currently stands, some courts are rejecting otherwise clearly egregious
discrimination claims in effort to fit within Congressional declarations that
Title VII excludes sexual orientation but protects gender discrimination. 156
This results in abhorrent gender discrimination claims being permitted
merely because the plaintiff was a homosexual, and the court trying to
avoid recourse for sexual orientation claims.157 With courts recognizing the
vulnerable groups has often been noted by both courts and scholars. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429
(1971)) (stating that Congress didn't enact Title VII to guarantee a job to everyone, but instead to
require "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the
barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification"); Belleville, 119 F.3d at 571; Amelia A. Craig, Musings About Discrimination Based on Sex
and Sexual Orientation as "Gender Role" Discrimination, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 105, 110
(1995) (noting that sexual harassment is recognized by courts as being more about an imbalance of
power than about an actual desire for sex).
153. See Hendricks, supra note 146, at 215.
154. See generally, Celia Gamrath, All in the Family: Gay Marriage Debate, CHICAGO LAWYER, Aug.
1 2009, at 20014, available at
http://www.chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2009/08/01/082009Family.aspx; Abby
Goodnough, Vote in Doubt As a Senate Takes Up Gay Marriage, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, at A20.
155. The Mormon Church recently recognized this distinction when it backed a prohibition on
sexual orientation discrimination in Salt Lake City similar to the one proposed here. See Politics, THE
EcoNoMIsT, Nov. 14, 2009, at 11. This was the first time the Church had backed this type of
legislation, stating that the anti-discrimination laws "do no damage to traditional marriage." Id. But
see, Unjust and Just Discrimination: Some Considerations Concerning the Catholic Response to Legislative
Proposals on the Non-Discrimination of Homosexual Persons, CATHOLIC INSIGHT, Feb. 1, 2005, at 22(3)
(stating that while Catholics should reject any discrimination against homosexuals as deplorable,
sexual orientation discrimination should not be treated the same as race or ethnic background
because homosexuality is an objective disorder).
156. See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 258-59 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding
that, despite plaintiff working in "a wretchedly hostile environment," and despite sexual
orientation discrimination being "a noxious practice, deserving of censure and opprobrium," it is
nonetheless settled Title VII precedent that if a discrimination claim is rooted in sexual orientation,
it must dismiss the action).
157. Cf id. If Higgins were a female and coworkers hung signs above her desk reading "Blow
Jobs 25c," called her vulgar names, mocked her feminine ways, made remarks about her imagined
sexual activities, and even accosted her in the bathroom, it is difficult (and indeed undesirable) to
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repugnant nature of sexual orientation discrimination, it makes little sense
to legislatively require them to attempt to artificially separate two naturally
conflated characteristics in order to permit some objectionable
discrimination to continue.158
Moreover, protecting sexual orientation discrimination is further
distinct from other positive sexual orientation legislation, such as gay
marriage, because Title VII will protect all from sexual orientation
discrimination equally, not just homosexuals. In Belleville, the youth was
subjected to degrading sexual orientation discrimination despite being
heterosexual.159 Sexual orientation discrimination is the result of a
harasser's perceptions, not of an individual's actual sexual orientation.160
This note does not suggest a court prod into the bedrooms of plaintiffs to
determine actual sexual orientation, but instead acknowledge that gender
discrimination includes, in part, sexual orientation discrimination; in other
words, an employer discriminating against an employee because the
employee does not match certain behavioral characteristics associated with
his/her sex. Prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination thus benefits both
heterosexuals and homosexuals, and therefore avoids the controversy
surrounding granting affirmative rights to only homosexuals. Protection of
the minority homosexual, who endures intolerance and discrimination due
to other's perceptions, actually benefits the majority as well.161
To illustrate this point, imagine a hypothetical: take a homophobic
heterosexual male, working in a male-dominated work environment, who is
harassed by coworkers.162 The employee is perceived (incorrectly) by his
coworkers to be in a homosexual relationship.163 As a result, he is constantly
called derogatory homosexual names such as faggot and Girl Scout, and is
threatened with physical assault, rape, or death for his perceived
homosexual way of life. He is assaulted in the hallways for being a
imagine a court would refuse relief under Title VII.
158. See Kramer, supra note 101, at 220 (noting that when a homosexual plaintiff brings a gender
discrimination claim, courts examine whether the plaintiff is bootstrapping an otherwise
impermissible sexual orientation claim, while they do not subject heterosexual plaintiffs to the same
scrutiny, leading to inconsistent treatment and unfair results).
159. Belleville, 119 F.3d at 592.
160. See Kramer, supra note 101, at 226 (examining Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64) (noting that the
victim's sexual orientation is less important than the harasser's perceptions of the victim's sexual
orientation); cf Belleville, 119 F.3d at 580 (noting that, despite plaintiff being heterosexual, he still
was subjected to "humiliating ... deeply personal" homosexual discrimination).
161. See Richard Kenyon, Discrimination Law Applies to Everyone, PERSONNEL TODAY, Jan. 22,
2008, at 1, available at
http://www.personneltoday.com/articles/2008/01/21/44016/discrimination-law-applies-to-
everyone.html.
162. This hypothetical is loosely based off of Hamm, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 878. In that case, the
plaintiff's complaint was held to merely claim discrimination based on speculation of sexual
orientation, and not because of sex as required by Title VII. Id. at 895. Also, the court felt that much
of the claimed discrimination was related to job performance. Id. at 900. Thus, it was dismissed. Id.
163. The use of a homophobic heterosexual male suggests that he would be even more offended
by being incorrectly assumed to be a homosexual. As a result, these hypothetical actions would
presumably be even more hurtful.
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homosexual, is the subject of profane graffiti describing him engaging in
lewd behaviors, and consistently has objects (such as lubricant for anal sex
and anal sex toys) left at his work station. Under the current construction of
Title VII suggested by Congress, this homophobic heterosexual male would
have no recourse in federal court because the discrimination was based on
his (perceived) sexual orientation. 64 The proposed amendment, however,
would expressly protect even the most homophobic heterosexual from a
hostile workplace where coworkers discriminate against him or her for
having a nonconforming sexual orientation in the harasser's eyes. This same
logic would protect the same heterosexual homophobic employee from the
rare occasion of being discriminated against by homosexual coworkers for
being heterosexual. Thus the change does not induce the fears often
associated with granting rights exclusively to homosexuals -claims that it
would lead to a deterioration of the moral and religious sensibilities of
Americans.165 Congress needs to look past the superficial appearance of
controversy to enact a change that is, in reality, not as controversial as it
appears.166 Thus, this Congress can surely succeed where past Congresses
have failed.
Any suggestion that including sexual orientation in Title VII would
open up the floodgates to litigationl 67 is manifestly without merit.168 The
same fears have been expressed at every step of Title VII's sex
discrimination evolution.169 However, as the Supreme Court pointed out,
Title VII does not act as a general civility code for the American
workplace.170 Instead, courts will continue to only let an action lie when
conditions are so severe that they alter the conditions of the victim's
164. See Hamm, 332 F.3d at 1065 (citing Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080 (7th Cir.
2000)).
165. 142 CONG. REC. S9992 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (claiming
amendment to Title VII would "override the moral and religious sensibilities of millions of
Americans").
166. Consider also that while gay marriage and other similar legislation crafts a decisive divide
amongst Americans, public opinion regarding sexual orientation discrimination has remained
consistently in favor of protecting against sexual orientation discrimination. See Timothy Smith,
Institutional Investors Find Common Ground With Social Investors, 1694 PRACrICING L. INST.: CORP.
LAw 257, 268 (2007).
167. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S10129-02 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nancy
Kassebaum) (arguing that protection of sexual orientation discrimination would lead to more
lawsuits and litigation, acting against greater tolerance in the workplace); Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 869 Before the S. Labor & Human Res. Comm., 105th Cong. 4
(1997) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (noting floodgate criticism).
168. See Tiffany L. King, Comment, Working Out: Conflicting Title VII Approaches to Sex
Discrimination and Sexual Orientation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1005,1041-42 (2002) (noting that, despite
state and municipal governments expanding civil rights to protect sexual orientation
discrimination, states have not suffered from frivolous lawsuits tying up the court system).
169. In fact, there is an argument that prohibitions on sex discrimination -as well as expanding
coverage to sexual orientation -actually decreases litigation because it compels employers to deter
discriminatory practices in the workplace. See Masako Kanazawa, Note, Schwenk and the Ambiguity
in Federal 'Sex' Discrimination Jurisprudence: Defining Sex Discrimination Dynamically Under Title VII,
25 SEATILE U. L. REV. 255, 269 (2001).
170. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
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employment. 171 This threshold requirement thus permits only meritorious
complaints to survive the pleading stages, and would be the same standard
applied to sexual orientation cases. Indeed, since courts are already
permitting gender-based discrimination claims, 172 which are inherent to
sexual orientation discrimination, there is tangible evidence that the courts
will not transform the American workplace. Sexual orientation claims, like
gender and sex discrimination claims, will only be permitted where odious
and otherwise arbitrary employment discrimination exists.173
Action at the state level further undercuts many of the arguments made
against amending Title VII. Currently, over twenty states already prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation.174 None of these states have
transformed the workplace into a hypersensitive, overregulated forum nor
opened the floodgates to litigation.175 Even major companies are
recognizing the need to stem sexual orientation discrimination, enacting
anti-discrimination policies that cover sexual orientation.176 This bottom-up
approach is worthwhile and should be commended, but it also should send
a signal to Congress that expanding Title VII to protect sexual orientation is
not only beneficial at the local level, but not as controversial as it may
appear on its face.177 Accordingly, Congress appears archaic in its inaction
to expressly remedy the artificial separation of sexual orientation
171. See id. at 81; Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22; Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67.
172. See supra Part III.
173. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
174. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12,920 (West 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402(1)(a) (2007); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81c(1) (West 2004); D.C. CODE § 2-1402.11(a) (LexisNexis 2008); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 378-2 (LexisNexis 2004); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-102A (West Supp. 2008); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 216.6(1)(a) (West 2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572(1)(A) (Supp. 2007); MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GoV'T §§ 20-603, 20-605, 20-606, 20-608 (West Supp. 2009); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
151B, § 4(1) (LexisNexis 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363A.08 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
613.330 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-
4 (West 2002); N.M STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (2008); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 2002); OR. REV.
STAT. § 659A.030 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495(a) (2003); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(1) (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.36(d) (West 2002).
175. See U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-135R, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER
IDENTITY EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: OVERVIEW OF STATE STATUTES AND COMPLAINT DATA
(2009) (summarizing, on a state-by-state basis, sexual orientation discrimination statutes, and
concluding there was no significant floodgate of litigation).
176. See Rebecca Tonn, More Employers Setting Policies to Protect Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender Workers, COLORADO SPRINGS BUs. J. (Oct. 2, 2009, 9:57 AM),
http://csbj.com/2009/10/02/more-employers-setting-policies-to-protect-gbt-workers; cf. Shawn
M. Filippi & Edward J. Reeves, Equality or Further Discrimination? Sexual Orientation
Nondiscrimination in Oregon Statutory Employment Law After Tanner v. Ohsu, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING
BUS. L. 269, 281-83 (1999) (discussing the economic aspects of sexual orientation discrimination,
citing an estimate from the National Commission on Employment Policies that discriminatory
environments for homosexual employees cost employers in excess of $1.4 billion and, as a result,
virtually all Fortune 500 companies have responded by attempting to create positive working
environments free of sexual orientation discrimination).
177. Since state governments and virtually all major companies grant all employees the right to
work in an environment free of sexual orientation discrimination, it follows there will likely be little
resistance in giving an aggrieved party access to federal court to remedy injury to the right. This is




discrimination claims from gender discrimination. 78
VI. CONCLUSION
Nearly 50 years ago, Wadell Sells was forced to bring an action for
blatant race discrimination through the Railway Labor Act, and the court
recognized "invidious discrimination" based on perceived stereotypes was
an evil that must be rooted out.179 Following Sells' and others' endured
injustices, Congress enacted Title VII. Today, the Third Circuit echoes that
same policy from the Sells decision in favor of Brian Prowel, declaring
perceived stereotypes based on gender and sexual orientation
impermissible. 80 Like Sells, Prowel comes at a time where clear
Congressional action is needed to protect employees from such forms of
invidious discrimination. Title VII exists to protect specific vulnerable
groups from intolerable treatment from those in power, based on the
powerful group's stereotypes of the vulnerable.181 As a result, it is necessary
for Congress to fill the illogical void in Title VII and add specific language
providing gender and sexual orientation as classes protected from
discrimination. 8 2
Sexual orientation discrimination is a very real, very frequent problem
in the American workplace. 83 This is far from surprising, given the
invisibility of heterosexuality and the minority status of homosexuals.as
This proposed amendment looks to harmonize both gender discrimination
and Title VII's aim to protect of the vulnerable minority in modem society.
The proposal is far from radical or even novel, yet its effect would elucidate
the federal legal landscape immensely and protect what is already
recognized detestable behavior. The addition of "gender" reflects well-
established legal landscape; adding "sexual orientation" recognizes the
inseparable nature of gender and sexual orientation, and reflects the reality
178. It is worth emphasizing here, again, that the current Title VII standard of requiring
significant, noxious discrimination repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court (see supra note 171)
will still apply. Therefore, any amendment to Title VII will not require coworkers to support, or
even approve of a person's supposed sexual orientation. No person will be forced to accept
homosexuality (or heterosexuality, for that matter), but instead merely be obliged to not create a
working environment so discriminatory that it would be hostile to a potential victim.
179. Sells, 190 F. Supp. at 860 (citing Conley, 355 U.S. at 41).
180. Prowel, 579 F.3d at 286.
181. See Belleville, 119 F.3d at 571 ("The discrimination Congress was concerned about when it
enacted Title VII is one stemming from an imbalance of power and an abuse of that imbalance by
the powerful which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group.").
182. The winds of change appear to be blowing in favor of action to fill this gap. President
Barack Obama recently vowed to include gender identity in his administration's nondiscrimination
policy. See Anna Stolley Persky, Free to Be: Recent Decisions Show Growing Acceptance of Transgender
Rights, 95 A.B.A. J. 22 (2009).
183. See Smith, supra note 166, at 268 (stating that nearly half of surveyed homosexuals have
reported sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace, and approximately one in ten have
reported they had been fired or dismissed improperly as a result of their sexual orientation).
184. See Kramer, supra note 101, at 208.
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of modem American society.
The change is a simple fix that will reap benefits of clarifying the legal
system and giving deserving plaintiffs a path to vindicate their rights, while
discouraging intolerance and discrimination. In fact, it has been
demonstrably successful at the state level already for virtually half the
country.185 Thus there is no evidence to suggest it would not work, nor that
it would be rejected by the people.186 We are past the days where
homosexuality is a "disease."187 This simple solution is just that - simple. Its
political hazards are minor and not analogous to wedge issues of granting
homosexuals positive rights, but instead allows anyone -homosexual or
heterosexual-to work in a society free of discrimination. This was the
purpose and spirit behind Title VII's original passage-to end arbitrary
discrimination. Today, courts are forced into the impossible position, being
asked to attempt separating the inevitably entwined. Courts should remain
passive instead of being the governmental body to evolve sex
discrimination over the years. Instead, Congress must take action as it did
nearly 50 years ago when it first enacted Title VII and amend the statute to
explicitly protect gender sexual orientation discrimination.
185. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
186. See Smith, supra note 166.
187. See RONALD BAYER, HOMOSEXUALITY AND AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY: THE POLITICS OF
DIAGNOSIS 3-5, 49-50 (Princeton Univ. Press 1987) (1981) (stating Evelyn Hooker originally
scientifically proved that mental experts could not distinguish between homosexual and
heterosexual patients, but it took the American Psychiatric Association twenty years to remove it
from its registrar of mental illnesses and arguing that this slow movement was the result of
homosexuality being a political and social issue, not a mental issue).
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